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PAUL H. ROBINSON*

JUSTIFICATION DEFENSES IN SITUATIONS
OF UNAVOIDABLE UNCERTAINTY: A REPLY
TO PROFESSOR FERZAN

I. THE INSIGHT: ONE MAY HAVE TO SPECULATE AS TO SOME
FACTS RELEVANT TO WHETHER CONDUCT IS JUSTIFIED

Professor

Ferzan's

paper

highlights

an important

insight

regarding self-defense: that the operation of the defense is
inevitably speculative. The actor cannot know with certainty
what in fact will happen if she does or does not act; she can only
act with regard to the facts as she knows them. But this aspect
of Professor Ferzan's insight only restates the obvious reason
for having a mistake-as-to-a-justification excuse (MAJ): in
order to insure that an actor's blameworthiness is ultimately
judged by the culpability, if any, inherent in the decision she
makes. The MAJ doctrine is similar in operation to the oper
ation of culpability requirements in offense definitions: the
objective elements may define the prohibited conduct, but lia
bility does not follow upon that showing alone but only upon a
showing of culpability as to those objective elements.
But Professor Ferzan's insight goes further, and has special
implications for self-defense: even for the adjudicator, self-defense
is necessarily a speculative business. That is, even in a �vorld of

perfect evidence gathering and event reconstruction, the decision
maker cannot know the facts needed to determine with certainty
the essential elements of self-defense, such as whether the force
used was really necessary to prevent an attack. For example,

* I would like to thank the organizers of the conference, chief among
them Professor Ferzan, for their efforts in convening such an interesting and

useful forum.
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when the hostage acts upon an opportunity on Tuesday to kill the
kidnapper who has threatened death at the end of the week, we
can never know whether the kidnapper would have changed his
mind, making the killing unnecessary.
This distinguishes the self-defense situation from the offense
definition situation: an effective fact-finding tribunal typically
can determine with some certainty whether the objective offense
elements are satisfied, that is, whether an injury was caused,
whether a partner was underage, whether the property belonged
to another, etc. But the same tribunal can only speculate about
whether the objective elements of self-defense existed.
It may be true that this typically is not a problem of practical
significance. Complete and absolute certainly may not be pos
sible but the actual level of uncertainty typically is trivial. An
angry attacker is swinging her arm to stab you in the chest. It is
conceivable that, for reasons unknown, she might change her
mind in the next moment, but such an event would be quite rare
in the course of human events. We tend not to take seriously
the purely theoretical existence of uncertainty. But there are a
few scenarios where the uncertainty cannot be ignored, as is the
case with the abductor who threatens to kill at the end of the
week. While it may not be likely, it is in fact conceivable that
something - a change of mind, intervention by police, etc. may intervene to avoid the need for the killing by the hostage.
II. DOES THE INSIGHT MEAN THAT JUSTIFICATIONS MUST
NECESSARILY BE SUBJECTIVE?

From her insight, Professor Ferzan draws the conclusion that
self-defense is necessarily, unavoidably subjective and, there
fore, that we must jettison the objective 'deeds' theory of jus
tification in favor of the subjective 'reasons' theory.
I admire the insight but disagree with the conclusion.
Professor Ferzan's insight leads to her conclusion along this
simple path:
if the actor cannot know the actual future, her blamewor
thiness can only be judged by the culpability of her belief, that
is, judged by the reasonableness of her prediction of the future
that she cannot know. To judge her otherwise

for example,
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according to purely objective criteria - is unjust both because
she cannot know the facts and, worse, even the adjudicator
cannot know the facts. The only available criteria by which her
blameworthiness can fairly and feasibly be judged is subjective.
I agree with this entire line of reasoning. My point is only

that it has nothing to do with the objective 'deeds' theory of
justification and its advantages over a subjective "reasons"
theory (that is, the advantages of segregating the issue of
objective justification from the issue of MAJ).
Professor Ferzan appears to begin with an assumption that
the purpose of the justification defense is to assess the actor's
blameworthiness. At one point she notes, for example: "The
deeds theorist must grant Harry the right to act at a time of
uncertainty, while simultaneously condemning him if he guesses
1
wrong." At another point she complains that the objective
2
view is "unfair to... agents."
3
But as I have argued in Structure & Function, I think the
justification defense is better formulated to serve a different
function than the adjudication-of-blameworthiness function
that she assumes it must have. I suggest that it is best seen as
serving the ex ante function of announcing the rules of (future)
conduct, rather than as serving the ex post adjudication func
tion, which I think is more than adequately served in this
context by the MAJ excuse. But having started with the
assumption that the justification defense serves the blamewor
thiness-adjudication function, Professor Ferzan then shows,
persuasively and conclusively, that the objective formulation
has problems and that the subjective formulation must be used.
The move is analogous, I suggest, to that in Kent Greenawalt's
well-known

piece

in

which

he

misconceives

justification

defenses to include the MAJ excuse then, not surprisingly, finds
the borders of justification and excuse to be "perplexing. "4

1

[p. 719].
[p. 719].
3 Paul H. Robinson, 'Structure and Function in Criminal Law' 105-123
(1997).
4 Kent Greenawalt,' The Perplexing Borders ofJustification and Excuse', 84
Columbia Law Review 144 (1984).
2
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Of course, Professor Ferzan is not alone in her assumption
that justification defenses must be seen as adjudicators of
blameworthiness. I am no scholar of the philosophy literature
but my limited exposure suggests to me that this is the
well-worn standard line. I don't think most such scholars even
see an issue on a matter on which I think they are wrong, so I
must ask myself why so much difficulty on this point? Why is
this assumption

that justification defenses must be about

blameworthiness assessment - so hard to think differently
about?
I don't have an answer, but here is a bit of very raw spec
ulation, which touches on the distinction between philosophers
5
and lawyers: most philosophers (but not a11 ) seem to see
criminal law doctrines as independent pieces, each of which
they take to be a test of blameworthiness in a particular set of
cases: self-defense cases, omission cases, complicity cases, cau
sation cases, attempt cases. Lawyers- at least modern lawyers
see the criminal code as a whole as being the only entity that
addresses the ultimate issue of blameworthiness; all of the
provisions in the code are just cogs in the larger machine, each
cog doing its small part toward the ultimate determination.
Certainly some of the cogs seem to come close to dealing
with the ultimate blameworthiness issue - offense culpability
requirements and excuse defenses in particular are of this sort but even this perception is an illusion. Note that culpability
requirements and excuse defenses are different

from one

another, in other words they are different cogs performing
different functions toward the ultimate end. And even these two
cogs only pick up where dozens of other cogs have left off. The
cogs defining prohibited conduct, causation, complicity, etc
have already done their work, or soon will. The notion that
justification defenses must be formulated to make a blame
worthiness assessment simply misconceives how modern crim
inal law works. (Of course, legal philosophers are free to make
up any conceptualizations they wish, even those that bear no
relation to the structure and practical challenges facing law, but
5

Michael Moore does not seem to take this view, and there may well be

others.
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then they ought not make claims that their conclusions have
meaning for law and they ought not criticize existing law based
upon their conceptualizations).
My specific point here is that justification defenses need have
no more to do with an ultimate blameworthiness assessment
than do the objective requirements of offense definitions- indeed
the two are similar in that both set the rules of conduct for future
action. We do not conclude that the objective requirements are
somehow immoral because they ignore blameworthiness; we
know they will be modified by a host of other doctrines in the
blameworthiness machine, including the offense culpability
requirements. We can have the same assurance with regard to an
objective justification defense: it serves its purpose of setting the
rules for (future) conduct, but is only one cog in the blamewor
thiness machine; the results of the justification defenses will be
cranked though other provisions, including the MAJ rules. 6
III. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE "INEVITABLY-SPECULATIVE"
INSIGHT FOR AN OBJECTIVE THEORY OF JUSTIFICATION

Let me return to Professor Ferzan's "inevitably-speculative"
insight about justification situations. If Professor Ferzan had
conceived of the 'deeds' theory of justification as serving a rule
articulation function, rather than an adjudication function, her
insight might have let her to put this criticism: while it may be
irrelevant to the "deeds" theory that this actor and the adju
dicator both must speculate about what would have happened
if this actor had not used her defensive force, the inevitably
speculative nature of self-defense does create a problem for the
rule-articulation function. Specifically, should not an effective
set of conduct rules tell future actors what risks they can and
cannot take in the face of the unavoidable uncertainty that
6

The better analogy here might be of two machines: the rule-articulation

machine whose cogs are the doctrines that serve the rule-articulation func
tion, standing next to and feeding its output into the blameworthiness
adjudication machine. The first requirement for blame is a violation of the
rules of conduct; then followed by a determination as to whether that vio
lation deserves punishment. I have identified which criminal law doctrines
serve which function in Structure & Function, 138-142.
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some self-defense situations may present? Should not the rules
of conduct give the imprisoned hostage some guidance as to
when she can kill the abductor who threatens death at the end
of the week?
I would answer: Yes, such guidance would be useful. Thus, I
must ask how justification's rules of conduct should take
account of the inevitably-speculative nature of some facts rel
evant to justification? That is a fair question, which I will ad
dress, but before doing so let me note a preliminary point.
The issue that the inevitably-speculative point raises here is

not one that involves the objective vs subjective justification dis
pute. The risk to be defined here is not the ex post adjudication
of risk-taking by which blameworthiness is judged. It is not a
"subjective" issue at all, taking "subjective" to refer to some
particular actor's actual awareness of risk in her mind at some
given moment. Rather, the issue is one of the ex ante objective
definition of prohibited risks. That is, it involves defining in

objective terms for all actors a rule to guide future actors in self
defense situations. It has nothing to do with a particular actor's
subjective awareness of risk and everything to do with society's
balance of competing interests. How much should society value
the certain loss of life of the abductor as against the risk of
death of the hostage? Where on the continuum of risk is the
point beyond which a self-defender cannot go? Thus, there is
nothing in the "inevitably-speculative" insight that undercuts
an objective theory of justification.
It is true that the objective theory must deal with an

uncertainty, specifically our inability to know at the moment
of action what the world would be like in the case of inaction.
One could even say that this uncertainty means that there
exists at the moment of decision a "risk." But as I have
argued elsewhere, 7 there is a difference between a particular
actor's subjective risk-taking and the existence of objective ex

ante uncertainties. In deciding what to do when facing an
uncertainty, a specific actor may engage in subjective risk7

Paul H. Robinson, Prohibited Risks and Culpable Disregard or In

atteractiveness: Challenge and Confusion in the Formulation of Risk
Creation Offenses, 4 Theoretical Inquires in Law 367

(2002).
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taking, something that is highly relevant - but only to criminal
law's adjudication function, and in particular to assessing the
MAJ excuse. The objective justification defense is interested
only in the

ex ante objective

risk, from the perspective of what

is knowable and not from the perspective of what a particular
actor knows. (Again, there is no need to define justification
defenses to hinge upon what a particular actor "believes.")
Now to the question of what the rules of conduct should say
as guidance to future actors about the inevitable uncertainty
that could exist in a self-defense situation. What guidance can
the law give?
Notice first that the criminal law's rule of conduct must be just
that: a legal

rule

of conduct, not a particular statement of dis

position like "give this hostage a defense." Similarly, the rule
must have some breadth; it cannot be a special rule for the hos
tages-threatened-with-death-at-the-end-of-the-week-who-have
a-chance-to-kill-on-Tuesday

cases.

If

the

rule-of-conduct

function is to be served, the rule must be stated in a form that will
give guidance in the infinite variety of situations in which self
defense may arise. And this necessarily presents real limitations
on what the rule should and can say.
This point may help explain the seemingly inevitable awk
wardness in conversations between those who support an
objective theory of justification because such a formulation best
serves the rules-of-conduct function and those who support an
objective theory because it "reflects some greater truth about
the nature of justifications." The latter group really do care
about resolving every bizarre hypothetical that the ingenious
professorial mind can create. The former group

"group" here

being used in a somewhat grandiose manner to refer to what I
fear may be a count of I

finds such exercises irrelevant,

entertaining, or hilarious, depending upon the immediate his
tory of alcoholic intake. I can probably develop an answer in
each bizarre case as to how, if I were dictator of the world, I
would balance the interests in conflict and, therefore, as to
whether I would judge conduct in the hypothesized case as
justified, but such analyses have little to do with how justifi
cation defenses in law should be formulated This is the dif
.

ference between being interested in philosophy for what it can
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do to improve law and being interested in philosophy for its
own sake.
Most philosophers

even those who are law professors -

don't seem to care about how the legal rule is formulated,
thinking such matters off the point (Recall Mitch Berman's
refusal to answer my simple question about whether he thought
the "believes" language should be included in a justification
defense). On the other hand, we in the "group" who see justi
fication defenses as articulation of the rules of conduct don't
care much about matters other than formulation issues; the
theorizing is important only for what it tells us about proper
formulation. With those seemingly mutually exclusive areas of
interest, engaged conversation tends either to be short or to be
long and awkward.
One further point regarding how rules of conduct should
take account of the self-defense inevitable-uncertainty problem:
the rule-articulation function must face the realities of the
world. I don't want to make too much of this; the law ought to
strive for the ideal, even if it is not always attainable. But it
ought not overreach, because doing so can undermine its goal
of effectively conveying rules of conduct Self-defense rules are
already highly unrealistic about what guidance the rules of
conduct can provide to the self-defender. To illustrate with one
small piece of the standard self-defense rules: one can use force
to defend against an unjustified attack, but not deadly force,
unless threatened with serious bodily injury, in which case one
can use deadly force, unless one can safely retreat, unless one is
in one's own place of work, unless it is also the attacker's place
of work. It is quite silly for the law to think that these conduct
rules really could be used to guide a self-defender's conduct.
Their effect may be more likely to obscure the guidance that
might well be conveyed. (Such detailed rules might be useful to
increase uniformity in adjudication, which is why have urged a
separate code of code and a code of adjudication, so the former

does not get obscured by the latter. 8)

What guidance is realistic to expect the law to give with
regard to the society's balance of interests arising from the
8

Structure & Function, 185-209.
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uncertainty of self-defense, such as the proper balance between
apparently certain death of the abductor (if the hostage kills
now) as against a risk of death for the hostage (if the hostage
delays killing)?
This is a hugely complicated calculation. In practice, I think
the law does now by way of guidance most of what I think it is
realistic for it to do: it tells the hostage that the use of defensive
force must be "necessary," which has a temporal aspect (as well
as its amount-of-force aspect). Indeed, it does more; in the
context of self-defense, it tells the actor that the force must be
"immediately necessary," thereby emphasizing the temporal
aspect. What more could we realistically expect it to do? Per
haps there are some good suggestions out there. I would be
interested to hear them. 9
But even if more guidance were possible, I think it doubtful
that the law should aim to provide guidance in the kind of
bizarre professorial hypotheticals that dominate this area.
These hypotheticals by their nature are the cases in which the
balance of competing interests and the justified nature of the
conduct is at its most ambiguous - that is the point in the
construction of the hypothetical. (That is similarly the point of
Professor Ferzan's highlighting the inevitably-speculative point
and the situations in which it can become significant.) But all
these cases, upon which the professors are so focused, are just
the cases

that are least useful in serving the rules-of-conduct
education function. They are the last cases that a legal system
would want to use as vehicles to convey the rules of conduct. (It
would be like using the special relativity principle to teach
introductory principles of physics. The former is of interest

specifically because

it seems inconsistent with the rules of the

latter.)
To conclude, Professor Ferzan's insight regarding the inev
itable uncertainty of some facts relevant to justification is to my
9

The definition of acceptable and of prohibited risk in the justification

situation is little different from the same challenge in the offense definition
situation, in which the law seeks to give people guidance as to the kind of
apparent risks that are forbidden. But in that latter context, there is room for
improvement and I have made some specific suggestions. See Structure &
Function, 148-153.
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mind most interesting, but I can see no reason why that
uncertainty should cause anyone to reject the objective theory
of justification in favor of a subjective theory. Yes, the deeds
theory ideally ought to give actors as much guidance as is
feasible in conforming to society's rules of conduct, and the
inevitably-speculative insight shows just how challenging that
task can be. But there is nothing in the insight that suggests any
advantage to defining justification defenses not as objective
inquiries but as focusing upon whether a particular actor
"believes " certain facts at a certain moment. That subjective
formulation of justification creates a long list of serious
difficulties that I have recounted elsewhere, 10 and nothing in
Professor Ferzan's insight either eliminates those difficulties or
gives reason to suffer them.

University of Pennsylvania Law School
3400 Chestnut Street
Philadelphia
P A, 19104-6204
USA

10

Structure

&

Function,

105-123.

